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RECENT PROBLEMS IN OBSCENE
PUBLICATION REGULATION AND
MOTION PICTURE CENSORSHIP
There has been growing interest in the field of obscenity and
its regulation, and the two following comments discuss some recent
problems in the areas of obscene publications and motion pictures.
The first discusses local problems in regulation of publication and
sale of obscene materials, and analyzes our present state laws, two
local ordinances, and recent Nebraska Supreme Court decisions.
The second discusses current problems of motion picture censorship
and includes a historical review of the development of modern
screen censorship.
The Editors
Obscene Publication Prohibition
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Nelson was charged with violating an ordinance
of the City of Omaha, Nebraska, by having in his possession, with
an intent to sell, an obscene publication. The publication in ques-
tion was the book, Peyton Place. The Municipal Court of Omaha
found the defendant guilty and levied a fine. The Douglas County
District Court affirmed and the defendant brought an appeal to
the Nebraska Supreme Court. Without reaching the question of the
book's obscenity the Supreme Court reversed, finding the Omaha
ordinance, set out below, unconstitutional as vague and indefinite.,
The ordinance read: 2
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer for sale, attempt
to sell, exhibit, give away, keep in his possession with intent to
sell or give away, or in any way furnish or attempt to furnish to
any person any comic book, magazine, or other publication which,
read as a whole, is of an obscene nature.
It is generally conceded that a state may legislate against the
' State v. Nelson, 168 Neb. 394, 95 N.W.2d 678 (1959).
2 OMAHA, NEB., MUNICIPAL CODE c. 12, art. 40.7, Ordinance No. 18508
(1941).
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publication of obscene materials,3 and that such legislation is not
ipso facto unconstitutional.4 Even at common law the publication
of obscene materials was an unlawful offense.5 Today it is univer-
sally recognized that obscene publications are not within the con-
stitutionally protected speech or press areas of the First Amend-
ment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
Local problems raised in the battle against obscene literature are:
(1) Finding a workable and accurate test for determining what is
obscene material, and (2) Drafting a statute not subject to con-
stitutional attack. Neither hurdle was cleared by the City of Omaha
in the Nelson case.
There seems to be no problem with "hard core" obscenity, or
pornography, which clearly has no constitutional protection. The
problem comes in identifying this material, as many publications
are found in those gray areas where the distinction between obscene
and non-obscene becomes difficult.7 Such a distinction is also subject
to the variety of impressions which a publication may have upon
various persons.
II. THE PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION
Anti-obscenity legislation is intended to protect the moral
standards of the community. The argument for prohibitions against
3 67 C.J.S. Obscenity § 4 (1950); 11 AM. JUR. Constitutional Law § 272(1937).
4 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); See the cases collected in Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957); 11 AM. JUR. Constitutional
Law § 272 (Supp. 1960).
5 [1727] Rex v. Curl, 2 Str. 788; Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Surr. Rep.
91 (1815); See the discussion in Williams, Obscenity in Modern English
Law, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 630 (1955); 33 AM. JUR. Lewdness,
Indecency, and Obscenity § 4 (1941).
0 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7 In KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW (1959), which at-
tempts to defend "erotic realism," a distinction between pornography
and non-obscene "erotic realism" is suggested: "In pornography (hard
core obscenity) the main purpose is to stimulate erotic response in the
reader. And that is all. In erotic realism, truthful description of the
basic realities of life, as the individual experiences it, is of the essence,
even if such portrayals . . . have a decidedly anti-erotic effect. But by
the same token, if while writing realistically on the subject of sex, the
author succeeds in moving his reader, this too, is erotic realism, and it is
axiomatic that the reader should respond erotically to such writing,just as the sensitive reader will respond, perhaps by actually crying, to
a sad scene, or by laughing when laughter is evoked." Id. at 18.
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obscene materials has been based upon such grounds as the protec-
tion of youth,8 the protection against stimulation of impure and
libidinous thoughts,9 and protection against sex impulses, 10 with
some courts branding obscene literature as "poison to the mind
causing itching, morbid, lascivious longings of desire and curiosity
or propensity for the lewd.""
The case of People v. Dial Press,12 is an illustration of this type
of protection. The book, The First Lady Chatterley, was found
obscene in that its central theme, in the opinion of the court, ad-
vocated that the most important thing in a woman's life, more
imporant than any rule of law or morals, was the gratification of
her sexual desires. This, the court said, was dangerous to the
physical and mental health of young women. The following year,
in 1945, the book Strange Fruit was found obscene in that it con-
tained over fifty episodes of indecent sexual acts, such episodes
being termed harmful to the public. 13 It has therefore been assumed
that obscene literature leads to immoral behavior although no valid
study has ever proved this assumption. 14 Some studies negate that
theory, coming to the conclusion that the chief stimulus to sex
impulses is the human body itself and not printed words. Certainly
the former would be difficult to censor. A further argument against
the relationship of obscene matter to immoral behavior is that those
who read salacious literature would be less likely to become sex
offenders for the reason that such reading often neutralizes sexual
interests,5 and still others would find such literature coarse, re-
pellent and non-stimulating.16
Although the present day tolerance of sex mores should only
be gauged by sociological study, it has been suggested that perhaps
8 State v. Clein, 93 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1957); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380 (1957).
9 Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
10People v. Vanguard Press, 192 Misc. 127, 130, 84 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430 (1947).
11 State v. Kowan, 7 Ohio Op. 2d 81, 156 N.E.2d 170 (1958).
12 182 Misc. 416, 48 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1944).
13 Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945).
14 See Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 587 (1955).
15 For a brief survey of several of these examinations see American Book
Publishers Council, Censorship Bulletin, August, 1958.
16 See the dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543,
62 N.E.2d 840 (1945), wherein the learned judge stated: "I can find no
erotic allurement such as the opinion makes necessary for conviction.
On the contrary, their [referring to scenes in the book] coarseness is
repellent." Id. at 850.
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the present trend in society is for a more liberal tolerance. 17 This
was also suggested in the United States District Court decision
which lifted the postoffice ban on the book, Lady Chatterley's
Lover.'8 The opinion of the court openly admits that the book con-
tains: 19
... a number of passages describing sexual intercourse in great
detail with complete candor and realism. Four letter Anglo-Saxon
words are used with some frequency.
The opinion concludes by stating that at the present stage in the
development of our society, the novel did not exceed the outer
limits of tolerance which the community as a whole gives to writing
about sex and sex relations. Thus, it seems The First Lady Chatter-
ley was a bit premature.
III. THE FEDERAL TEST FOR OBSCENITY
The legal test for obscenity which was first introduced into the
United States, came from the opinion of Lord Chief Justice Cock-
burn in the case of Regina v. Hicklin,20 decided in 1868. Speaking
for the court the Chief Justice said: 21
I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands
a publication of this sort may fall.
The problem presented by this test was the absence of a limitation
upon the amount or degree of obscenity necessary to convict. Thus,
any segment of the publication could brand the entire work as
obscene. The Hicklin rule was soon adopted in the United States,
although it was sometimes ignored. In United States v. Kennerley,22
the Hicklin rule was followed, but in an attack upon the rule, Judge
Learned Hand stated that obscenity should be defined according to
present community standards. The Ulysses case in 193423 finally
repudiated the Hicklin rule and in its place substituted the "read
17KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 19 (1959).
18 Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
aff'd, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960).
19Id. 175 F. Supp. at 500.
20 [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
21 Id. at 371.
22 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
23 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
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as a whole test. -2 4 Thus, the injustice of banning a book because
one segment was obscene, was discarded and the new rule demanded
that the whole of the book, all of its parts, he examined before
judging its obscene nature. In 1957, in Roth v. United States, 5 the
United States Supreme Court refined the rule, saying: 
26
The standard for judging obscenity, adequate to withstand the
charge of constitutional infirmity, is whether, to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest.
Although somewhat nebulous and criticised,27 this is the test as
it stands at this writing. The test has had support of municipal
officials who have felt they now have a yardstick to measure com-
munity standards by trying obscenity cases before a jury of com-
munity members and letting that jury set the standard by their
decision.2 8 Other suggested tests for obscenity are found in the
proposed Model Penal Code, 29 which would allow a showing of
the audience to whom the material is directed, the appeal to and
the behavior of the audience, the artistic, literary, scientific or
educational merits of the material, the degree of public acceptance,
the appeal to prurient interest in the promotion of such material,
expert testimony, and the testimony of the author, creator or pub-
lisher.
The Roth test requires-judging the material "taken as a whole."
Contrary to this requirement is the decision of State v. Kowan,
30
which held the "read as a whole test," although applying to books,
did not apply to magazines. After stating the purpose and some
24 Id. at 708. The test was announced as follows: "While any construction
of the statute that will fit all cases is difficult, we believe that the proper
test of whether is given book is obscene is its dominant effect. In apply-
ing this test, relevance of the objectionable parts to the theme, the es-
tablished reputation of the work in the estimation of approved critics,
if the book is modern, and the verdict of the past, if it is ancient, are
persuasive pieces of evidence; for works of art are not likely to sustain
a high position with no better warrant for their existence than their
obscene content." Ibid.
25 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
26 Id. at 489.
27 State v. Nelson, 168 Neb. 394, 95 N.W.2d 678 (1959).
28 Melaniphy, The Interpretations by the Courts of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution as They Relate to Obscene Motion Pic-
tures and Publications, 21 NIMLO MUNIC. L. REV. 65 (1958).
29 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (2), (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
30 7 Ohio Op. 2d 81, 156 N.E.2d 170 (1958).
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of the history of the above test, the court adopted the reasoning of
City of Cincinnati v. Walton,3 1 saying:
The as a whole test was built up by the courts to escape from the
absurd result that was produced when one took, out of context,
isolated passages from a sincere book. But where the parts are not
specifically related-where, as here, you have a succession of pic-
tures and stories each conveying an individual message-each can
be judged individually. The entire magazine should be examined
to cast light on the publisher's intent but an individual picture
or story in a magazine not related to the whole can be tested by the
principles hereinbefore set out, and can be found obscene.
IV. THE ROTH TEST IN NEBRASKA
Following the language of the federal test in the Roth case,
the Omaha ordinance, found unconstitutional in the Nelson de-
cision, concluded with the following phrase: "which, read as a
whole, is of an obscene nature. '32 This particular part of the
ordinance was declared unconstitutional. In the Nelson opinion
the Nebraska Supreme Court went on and construed the federal
test.33 No trouble was found with the words "average person"
which were held comparable to the reasonable man standard so
often used in tort litigation. "Prurient interest" did not fare as
well, the court pointing out that it doubted whether a judge or
a juror would be able to apply the phrase without conjecture or
resort to a dictionary. The phrase "contemporary community
standards" was said to create an area of vagueness that would
itself require a holding that the ordinance was vague and in-
definite. "Community" was found highly analogous to the term
"locality," which was found fatally vague in Connally v. General
Construction Co. 34 The Nebraska court denounced the phrase,
"of an obscene nature," saying this was far more indefinite than
the phrase "prurient interest." In State v. Pocras,35 a Nebraska
case dealing with a City of Lincoln ordinance, which was decided
31 3 Ohio Op. 2d 252, 257, 145 N.E.2d 407, 414 (1957).
32 Supra note 2.
33 State v. Nelson, 168 Neb. 394, 397-99, 95 N.W.2d 678, 681 (1959).
34 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
35 166 Neb. 642, 90 N.W.2d 263 (1958). The court ruled on and found uncon-
stitutional the language of LINCOLN, NEB., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 21-213(1936), which read in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person or persons
within the limits of said city . . . to sell or offer for sale, or dispose of
in any manner, any obscene, lewd, or indecent book, picture, or other
publication or thing." (Emphasis added).
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approximately a year prior to the Nelson decision, the same court
held the language, "obscene, lewd or indecent" sufficient to meet
the constitutional requirements of due process of law. The court
quoted from State v. Becker,36 which in part stated: 
3 7
The words of the statute, obsence, lewd, licentious, indecent,
lascivious, immoral, scandalous are . . . descriptive of the char-
acter of the publication .... Those descriptive words are neither
vague nor indefinite. . . . Those words set out within this statute
a clear and ascertainable standard of guilt which is readily to be
comprehended.
Therefore, perhaps what is "obscene" is more ascertainable and
definite than something of an "obscene nature."
Following the Nelson decision, the City of Omaha ordinance
was redrafted to remove those portions found objectionable by the
state supreme court. Before approval of the new ordinance could
be obtained, the United States Supreme Court rendered the de-
cision in Smith v. California.38
V. SCIENTER AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
In the Smith case the Supreme Court found unconstitutional
a City of Los Angeles ordinance which made it a crime:3 9
... for any person to have in his possession any obscene or inde-
cent writing, or book . . . in any place of business where . . .
books . . . are sold or kept for sale....
The ordinance was held to violate the freedom of the press, safe-
guarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteeneth Amendment,
in that it imposed an unconstitutional limitation on the public's
access to non-obscene constitutionally protected matter. The Court
declared the element of scienter as to the contents of a book to be
necessary for a conviction of the bookseller, saying that mens rea
is the rule of, rather than the exception to, Anglo-American crim-
inal jurisprudence. 40 The seller's knowledge of the obscene con-
tents of the book must now be proved. The Court sidestepped the
question of what evidence would be necessary to show that the
36 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d 283 (1954).
37 Id. at 1087, 272 S.W.2d at 288.
38361 U.S. 147 (1959). Noted in 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 289 (1960); 35
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1086 (1960).
39 For purposes of comparison, see the Los Angeles ordinance set out in full
in 361 U.S. at 148 (1959).
40 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
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seller had knowledge of a book's obscene contents by saying, "We
need not . . .pass on what sort of mental element is requisite to
a constitutionally premissible prosecution of a bookseller for carry-
ing an obscene book in stock."'4 1 This failure to establish some guide-
posts in establishing scienter evidence was criticized in a concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. 42 The Court did state, how-
ever, that eyewitness testimony of a bookseller's perusal of a book
would not be necessary to prove a seller's awareness of its con-
tents. And to counteract the possibility of false denials of knowl-
edge the Court stated: 43 "[I]t has been some time now since the
law viewed itself as impotent to explore the actual state of a man's
mind."
In the case of City of Cincinnati v. King,44 the appeal was
decided after the Smith decision and the Ohio court found a seller
guilty of having in his possession, with an intent to sell, a pub-
lication which the defendant knew to be obscene. Because of this
knowledge, the defendant had hid the publication in his basement.
Specific knowledge here met the test of the Smith case. By dictum
the Ohio court also asserted that general knowledge of a publica-
tion's obsence contents would be sufficient to convict. The court
stated that facts which would put a seller on inquiry were: (1)
Cheap paper-covered books selling for several dollars, and (2)
Their titles, covers and names may suggest the nature of their con-
tents. Whether these latter elements will be accepted remains to
be seen.
Typically, obscene literature legislation has been in the form
of strict-liability laws protecting the public welfare, in which mere
possession was sufficient to convict; 45 such were the ordinances in
the Nelson and Pocras cases. The impact of the Smith decision
has necessitated re-writing present obscenity legislation of many
states and cities throughout the country.
With the decision in the Smith case, the City of Omaha again
amended its obscene publications ordinance by inserting the word
41 Id. at 154.
42 Id. at 162.
43 Id. at 154.
44 11 Ohio Op. 2d 433, 168 N.E.2d 633 (1960).
45 For example see our present state laws found in NEB. REV. STAT. §§
28-920 to -926 (Reissue 1956).
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"willfully" for the purpose of showing scienter.0 The ordinance
now reads: 47
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons willfully to print,
sell, offer for sale, attempt to sell, loan, give away, exhibit, dis-
tribute, show, keep in his possession with intent to sell, or give
away any obscene, lewd, indecent, libidinous, immoral, lustful
book, comic book, picture, magazine, or other publication.
Obviously, the City of Omaha was still relying on the finding by
the Nebraska Supreme Court in the Pocras case that the words
"obscene, lewd, indecent, libidinous, immoral or lustful," had an
ascertainable standard of guilt and met that due process require-
ment.
The word "willfully," as used in the Omaha ordinance, is a
word of many meanings and its definition is often set by reference
to its context. "Willfully" can be construed to mean intentionally,
voluntarily or knowingly, and under such a construction its in-
sertion would fail to meet the scienter requirement of federal due
process. It is submitted that the addition of the following phrase
to the Omaha ordinance would clear up any difficulty with the
word "willfully," to wit: 48 "knowing said publication to be obscene,
lewd, indecent, libidinous, immoral or lustful."
It should be pointed out that not all local authorities have
turned to the courts or to legislation to solve obscene publication
problems. At times some authorities have resorted to informal
prohibitions through threats of prosecution made to the seller.
Such "do-it-yourself" techniques have been held unlawful.49
VI. THE CITY OF LINCOLN ORDINANCE
By comparison, the present ordinance of the City of Lincoln,
Nebraska,50 redrafted after the Pocras decision in 1958, although
eliminating mere possession, makes no mention of a scienter re-
46 Correspondence to Parker Shipley from Edward M. Stein, Assistant City
Attorney, City of Omaha, Nebraska, February 8, 1960.
47 OMAHA, NEB., MUNICIPAL CODE § 25.46.070 (as amended 1958)
(emphasis added).
48 See the present ordinance set out in the text of this article at footnote 47.
49 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47 (1953).
50 The 1958 amendment to the LINCOLN, NEB., MUNICIPAL CODE § 21-
213 (1936), reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person or persons within
the limits of the City of Lincoln to sell, offer for sale, loan, give away,
distribute or show any obscene, lewd or indecent book, picture, magazine,
or other publication or thing."
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quirement and is still a strict liability ordinance. It is submitted
that this ordinance is unconstitutional under the due process re-
quirement of the Smith case, in not compelling a mental element
of scienter as a conditon for a conviction.
VII. NEBRASKA STATE LAWS
The state obscenity laws, on the books at this writing, are
found in chapter 28, article 9 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.5 '
They have been on the books untouched since 1887. There is no
requirement of scienter in these laws and mere possession, regard-
less of knowledge, is made sufficient for a conviction. These sec-
tions prohibiting mere possession or which do not require an ele-
ment of scienter are clearly unconstitutional.52
VIII. CONCLUSION
Obscenity regulation is in a period of transition, turning from
obsolete strict liability to the necessity of an awareness of wrong-
doing to uphold a conviction. Without guideposts, the long process
of case-by-case decision will eventually answer the question of
what constitutes awareness for the scienter requirements of due
process of law. Because of this void left by the Smith case, prosecu-
tors will be forced to guess intelligently if they are to sustain the
proof requirement of the Smith case.
In Nebraska our present state obscenity laws have been recog-
nized as unconstitutional and legislation is now pending before the
Unicameral to correct this situation.53
The decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court in the recent
cases State v. Pocras54 and State v. Nelson,55 were based upon the
constitutional infirmity of an uncertain standard of guilt. There-
51 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-921, -922; -924 to -926 (Reissue 1956).
52 At this writing, a bill is pending before the seventy-second session of the
Nebraska Legislature which would amend the state's obscenity laws. The
object of the bill as introduced would be to provide both criminal and
civil sanctions for violations. Since there has been no final action on the
bill, as this article went to press, no attempt to cover its specific provisions
will be made. (L.B. 676).
53 See note 52 supra.
54 166 Neb. 642, 90 N.W.2d 263 (1958).
55 168 Neb. 394, 95 N.W.2d 678 (1959).
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fore, any legislation which is passed in Nebraska will have to be
free of vague or ambiguous terms-a requirement which is difficult
to meet in the obscenity area. The federal test for what is obscene
material has been heavily criticized by the Nebraska Court and
any attempt to employ that test in Nebraska would be futile. Our
court, however, has given positive answers, in that a reasonable
man standard can be used in judging an article's effect upon the
consumer, and that the words "obscene, lewd, indecent, libidinous,
immoral or lustful" convey an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Parker Shipley, '61
Motion Picture Censorship
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, a motion picture distributing corporation, wished to
exhibit in Chicago, Illinois, the movie, Don Juan, but refused to
submit the film to the Board of Censors as was required by the
Municipal Code prior to its public showing.1 The appropriate city
official refused to grant the permit on the sole ground that the film
had not been produced for examination. Petitioner brought an
action for an injunction and an order for the issuance of the permit,
contending Section 155-4 of the Code was unconstitutional on its
face as a prior restraint within the prohibition of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.2 Held: Section 155-4 of the Chicago Mu-
1 "Such permit shall be granted only after the motion picture film for
which said permit is requested has been produced at the office of the
commissioner of police for examination or censorship .... If a picture
or series of pictures, for the showing or exhibition of which an applica-
tion for a permit is made, is immoral or obscene, or portrays, depravity,
criminality, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed,
or religion and exposes them to contempt, derision, or obloquy, or
tends to produce a breach of the peace or riots, or purports to represent
any hanging, lynching, or burning of a human being, it shall be the
duty of the commissioner of police to refuse such permit; otherwise it
shall be his duty to grant such permit." CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL
CODE § 155-4 (1931).
2 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I, and, "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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nicipal Code is not unconstitutional per se as requiring the sub-
mission of films prior to their public exhibition.
3
The principal case climaxes a long history of doubt as to the
validity of motion picture censorship laws solely on the ground that
they exercise a prior restraint upon publication. Prior restraint has
historically meant such restrictions before publication as injunction
or censorship as opposed to punishment subsequent to publication.
4
At the English common law, after the expiration of the last
Licensing Act, one writer had shown the general antipathy toward
any form of prior restraint before publication.5 In the movie indus-
try, prior restraint takes the form of censorship by a governmental
body before a movie can be seen by the public. The movie is already
in existence, but before its exhibition statutes and ordinances re-
quire its submission to a Censorship Board before the necessary per-
mit is issued. The laws set forth different standards by which the
censor is able to ban the film in its entirety, or delete isolated scenes
which fall within the prohibitions of the laws. The laws make the
censor the overseer of the public morals and conduct. The natural
supposition to be drawn from these laws is the existence of a public
standard of conduct which should be guided by the censor's personal
convictions. This type of official censorship-the requirement of
3 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
4 The earlier English law forbade the right of free speech and press when
it was used to criticize the sovereign or the government. This was so
even if the views expressed were true. The problem of freedom of ex-
pression was compounded when the printing press was introduced and
became widely used in the middle of the seventeenth century. At this
time, the Crown regulated the use of the press by determining the num-
ber of printers and presses, when printing could be done, and finally
by requiring all books to be licensed before circulation. 2 MAY, CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 2-4 (1912). The procedural
vehicle was the powerful Star Chamber, whose powers gradually in-
creased until 1637 when the following decree was passed: "That no
person or persons whatsoever shall presume to print . . .any seditious,
schismatical, or offensive Books or Pamphlets, to the scandal of Religion,
or the Church, or the Government . . .or particular person or persons
whatsoever ...... Hales, Introduction to MILTON, AREOPAGITICA at V
(1904). The Licensing Act, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33, illustrates the
breadth of the system. No person was allowed to print any book until
it was first entered with the Stationers' Company, a government monopo-
ly, and duly licensed by the appropriate state or clerical functionary.
In 1694, the last Licensing Act expired, and Parliament refused to pass
another. 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 309, 310 (1883).
5 "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. . ..
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advance approval before a film can be shown-illustrates what is
probably the closest approach to the English Licensing Laws of the
seventeenth century. No doubt, censorship of motion pictures is
prior restraint in its classical form.6 The purpose here is to analyze
the issues involved in motion picture censorship and how the Su-
preme Court has decided these issues under the United States Con-
stitution.
II. MOTION PICTURES UNDER THE FIRST
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The City of Chicago passed the first motion picture censorship
ordinance in 1907. 7 Two years later, this ordinance brought about
the first litigation concerning censorship of films, and the ordinance
was upheld.8 It was not until 1915 that the Supreme Court of the
United States was faced with a similar issue in Mutual Film Corp v.
Ohio.9 The court, in construing the Ohio Constitution, regarding
[T]o subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was
formerly done, both before and since the Revolution, is to subject all
freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the
arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning
." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 145 (4th ed. Kerr 1876).
Blackstone's quotation has often been referred to in order to ascertain
the meaning of the First Amendment. "[T]he main purpose of such con-
stitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon
publication as had been practiced by other governments,' and they do
not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed con-
trary to the public welfare. . . . The preliminary freedom extends as
well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend
as well to the true as to the false." Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,
462 (1907). Cited also in dissenting opinion in Times Film Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 53 (1961) (Warren, C. J., dissenting). Other cases
have repudiated the Blackstone theory. See Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919); State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 46 Atl. 409 (1900); State
v. Pioneer Press Co., 100 Minn. 173, 110 N.W. 867 (1907).
6 See note 4 supra.
7 CHICAGO CITY CHARTER, art. 5, cl. 45 (1907).
8 Block v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N.E. 1011 (1909).
9 236 U.S. 230 (1915). "The court could not then realize the importance of
this new method for communicating facts and ideas to great masses of
the public. In spite of the deeply rooted Anglo-Saxon antagonism to
censorship of the press, the Justices were willing to distinguish films and
let them be subject to the previous restraint which even Blackstone
regarded as inconsistent with free discussion. Justice Holmes is said to
have expressed regret, many years afterwards, that he ever concurred
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freedom of speech and of the press,'0 in relation to the Ohio censor-
ship statute, 11 held motion pictures outside the protection of free-
dom of the press. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned
that motion pictures were merely spectacles and outside the ambit
of public expression.1 2 At the time of this decision, only three
states had censorship laws.18
The decision of the Mutual case did not change quickly, and
was reiterated in subsequent decisions both as to its reasons and
results.' 4 But a slow erosion took place within the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Paramount Pictures,5 Mr. Justice Douglas, by
way of dictum, expressed the First Amendment's protection of mo-
tion pictures.16 His feelings were reiterated in the dissent in Kovacs
v. Cooper,17 in which Mr. Justice Douglas concurred.
The Mutual decision was not overruled until 1952 in Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.18 In that case the issue of whether motion
pictures were a form of expression to be protected within the First
Amendment as applied to the states through the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was squarely
before the court. The court had to consider the New York censor-
in this decision and that he did not sense its consequences." CHAFEE,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 544 (1941).
10 "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall
be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press."
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11.
11 "[O]nly such films as are . . . of a moral, educational, or amusing and
harmless character.... ." OHIO REV. CODE § 3305.04 (1960).
12 "It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a
business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other
spectacles, not to be regarded, not intended to be regarded by the Ohio
Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs
of public opinion." 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
13 OHIO REV. CODE § 3305.04 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 43 (1930);
KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-101 to -112 (1949). These statutes are taken
from the recent editions of the respective state statutes.
14 Mutual Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 224 Fed. 101 (7th Cir. 1915);
Eureka Productions v. Lehman, 17 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. N.Y. 1936). Even
as late as 1950 the decision was relied upon. RD-DR Corp. v. Smith,
183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
15 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
16 "We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are
included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 166 (1948).
17 See 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
18 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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ship statute 1' as applied to the motion picture, The Miracle. The
court had little trouble finding motion pictures now within the pro-
tection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 20 The court did
have difficulty invalidating the statute on the grounds of prior re-
straint, for although they mentioned it,21 they had previously stated
that each method of expression presents its own problems and
control might therefore differ.
22
The court was confronted with an additional problem since the
censorship board had revoked the license to show The Miracle on
the grounds that it was "sacrilegious." The issue presented by the
term "sacrilegious" was whether it met the standards of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as being too vague
or indefinite. Therefore, the court also had to consider the proce-
dural due process requirements of the Constitution. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter felt that the term "sacrilegious" was clearly too vague
to meet the above requirements of procedural due process.2 3 There-
fore, in spite of what the court had said regarding the issue of un-
19 The New York censorship statute empowers the censor to examine every
motion picture sought to be exhibited in the state and to license them
for exhibition, "unless such film or part thereof is obscene, indecent,
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character [as] would tend
to corrupt the morals or incite to crime .... " N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 122-
32 (1953).
20 "It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment's
aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-
scale business conducted for private profit. We cannot agree. That books,
newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not
prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safe-
guarded by the First Amendment." 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
21 "This court recognized many years ago that . . . previous restraint is a
form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially con-
demned." 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
22
"If there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in determining the per-
missible scope of community control, but it does not authorize sub-
stantially unbridled censorship such as we have here. * * * It does not
follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every
motion picture of every kind at all times and all places .... Nor does
it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules
governing any other particular method of expression. Each method tends
to present its own peculiar problems." 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952).
23 "We not only do not know but cannot know what is condemnable by
'sacrilegious.' And if we cannot tell, how are those to be governed by the
statute to tell.
"It is this impossibility of knowing how far the form of 'sacrilegious'
carries the proscription of religious subjects that makes the term uncon-
stitutionally vague." 343 U.S. 495, 531 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurr-
ing).
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constitutionality per se in relation to the statute being a prior re-
straint on expression by means of censorship, the court explicitly
stated that they did not decide, "whether a state may censor motion
pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to pre-
vent the showing of obscene films. '24
Therefore, the ratio decidendi of the Burstyn case is two-fold.
Motion pictures now seem to be within the protection of freedom of
speech and of the press under the First Amendment as applied to
the states under the Privilege and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and if a censorship statute is to be held con-
stitutional at all, it must be definite under the necessary require-
ments of Procedural Due Process. The court's dictum relating to
the possibility of prior restraint upon motion pictures as a form of
expression does find weight in previous language used by the court.
In Near v. Minnesota,25 the court was concerned with the Minnesota
"Gag Statute" which made available injunctive relief against news-
papers when they published copy tending toward criminal libel.
The court, holding the prior restraint unconstitutional, mentioned
certain exceptions to the rule of complete freedom of expression. 26
These exceptions have been reiterated in a number of decisions in
the form of criminal punishment for expression outside the limits of
24 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
25 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The United States Supreme Court invalidated the
statute, MASON'S MINN. STAT. § 10123-1 (1927), as a prior restraint
upon publication under the First Amendment as applied to the states
through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The leading case in Nebraska concerning prior restraint upon news-
paper publication is Howell v. Bee Publishing Co., 100 Neb. 38, 158 N.W.
358 (1916). In that case Howell, before becoming a candidate for gov-
ernor, published a statement disaffirming any desire to seek the post.
As the primary election approached he changed his mind, but the de-
fendant published the original statement in its newspaper. Howell sought
an injunction to restrain defendant from again publishing or circulating
the article. The lower court held for Howell, but the Supreme Court of
Nebraska reversed, stating, "[A] court cannot use its equity powers to
prevent the publication of political matter merely on the ground that it
is untruthful or misleading, its truthfulness and its publication for good
motives and for justifiable ends being a defense in an action at law."
100 Neb. 39, 42, 158 N.W. 358, 359 (1916). The case was decided under
the Nebraska Constitution: "Every person may freely speak, write and
publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty;
and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth when pub-
lished with good motives, and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient
defense." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5.
26 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931): "[T]he protection even as
to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has
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the First Amendment, 27 such as criminal libel and inciting riots.
What the court does fail to point out is that there are an equal
number of decisions which constantly reaffirmed the proposition of
no prior restraints in the form of licensing ordinances which act as
censorship in fields other than the exhibition of motion pictures.28
Although the Supreme Court had not held censorship as applied
to motion pictures per se unconstitutional, there arose between 1952
and 1961 a number of per curiam decisions invalidating every
motion picture censorship law which came before the Supreme
Court. It is interesting to note the different concurring opinions
which seemingly expand the narrowness of the Burstyn decision.
In Gelling v. Texas, 29 the court was confronted with a censorship
ordinance from Texas. The ordinance in question authorized the
board of censors to deny a license if a motion picture was found to
be "of such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the
people of said city" and provided criminal fines. The Texas Court
upheld both the ruling of the Censorship Board and a fine of $200.00
for showing the film without their approval. 30 The Supreme Court
reversed, citing the Burstyn decision and Winters v. New York.3 1
In citing these two opinions, the court appears to be declaring the
Texas ordinance unconstitutional under the "vague and indefinite"
standards of the Procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in that "of such character as to be prejudicial to the
best interests of said city," is too broad a standard for the censor-
been recognized only in exceptional cases: 'When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured ... .' Schenck v.
United States 249 U.S. 47, 52. . . . On similar grounds, the primary re-
quirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications....
The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not 'protect a man from
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.'
Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911)."
27 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
29 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam).
30 157 Tex. Crim. 516, 247 S.W.2d 95 (1952).
31333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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ship board to operate under.32 The concurring opinions take oppos-
ing positions.33
In reversing the lower courts in Superior Films, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Education and Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 34 the
court cited only the Burstyn decision. The Superior case was based
upon whether the movie was "moral" and "tending to corrupt
morals." In spite of the concurring opinion, the majority appears to
be invalidating the lower court decision on the criterion of vague-
ness. In Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 5 the court failed to
eliminate the status of censorship strictly under the First Amend-
ment, citing only the Burstyn case. Again, one can infer that the
reasons for reversal were based upon the Procedural Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The last per curiam decision was handed down by the Supreme
Court in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago.36 The Censorship
Board of Chicago had refused to issue the necessary permit for the
motion picture, Game of Love, on grounds that the movie was "im-
moral and obscene". Upon reversal, the Supreme Court cited Al-
berts v. California7 and Roth v. United States.38 In citing these
two cases, the court introduced another issue into the movie censor-
ship problem. Both Alberts and Roth dealt with obscenity in pub-
lications. The court held obscene expression not to be within the
protection of the First Amendment, 9 and set forth a standard for
32 The lower court dismissed the problem of the wide discretion given to the
Board of Censors because the issue had not been raised. Therefore, the
problem of delegating too much authority to such a board was not decided.
157 Tex. Crim. 516, 247 S.W.2d 95 (1952).
33343 U.S. 960 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 343 U.S. 960 (1952)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
34 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam). Both decisions were handed down at
the same time.
35 350 U.S. 870 (1955) (per curiam).
36 355 U.S. 35 (1957) (per curiam).
37 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
38 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
39 "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-un-
orthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing
climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless
excludable because they encroach upon the liimted area of more im-
portant interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). In discussing another type of literature-
crime magazines and comic books-which appears to be "without redeem-
ing social importance," the court had previously found to be protected in
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) by stating, "We do not accede
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deciding whether a publication was obscene. 40 By citing these two
cases, two inferences may be drawn. First, the contents of the
motion picture in question did not meet the court's standards for
obscenity, and secondly, since the movie was not obscene, the con-
tent of the motion picture was under the protection of the First
Amendment. But the question of unconstitutionality due to prior
restraint remained unanswered.
In Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents,41 the Supreme Court
was again confronted with the New York Censorship Law.42 The
Board had refused to license the picture, Lady Chatterly's Lover,
because its content was a "presentation of adultery as a desirable
and proper pattern of behavior. '43 The Supreme Court held the
basis for not issuing the license unconstitutional since the First
Amendment's purpose was for the protection of ideas. The court
carefully pointed out that the state court had "unanimously and
explicitly rejected any notion that the film is obscene," 44 and cited
the Roth case.
III. THE TIMES CASE
As the facts of the recent Supreme Court holding in the Times
Film Corp. v. Chicago,45 previously stated in the Introduction, point
out, it is not unconstitutional for a censorship statute to empower
an administrative agency with the right to view every motion
picture before its public exhibition. Therefore, censorship laws are
not per se unconstitutional. The issue was so put to the court that
it had only to decide the method of the censorship law, and not the
to appellee's suggestions that the constitutional protection for a free
press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line between the in-
forming and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic
right. . . .What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine.
Though we see nothing of any possible value to society in these maga-
zines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the
best literature." 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
40 "[Wlhether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest." 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
41360 U.S. 684 (1959).
42 See note 19 supra.
43 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959).
44 Id. at 686.
45 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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substance. 46 The case certainly does not stand for the proposition
that once the censor has viewed the movie he may proceed unre-
stricted, for the same scrutiny mentioned previously in the other
motion picture cases will be applied. The court justifies its results
under the previously discussed exceptions to the First Amendment,
and relies heavily upon the dictum of the Burstyn case.47
From the above cases two conclusions can be drawn. The Court
will first examine a censorship statute under the Procedural Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to be certain
that it is not vague or indefinite. If the statute in question meets
the necessary requirements for definiteness, and the motion picture
is not obscene within the Roth test, the Court will decide the issue
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as incorporating the guaranties of the First Amend-
ment.4 8 Those areas thus protected may be summarized as follows:
Any motion picture which is of a religious nature,49 or which could
be considered political, even if it contains criminal libel,50 would be
protected against prior restraint. The censorship of newsreels, as-
suming they depict politics or social conduct, is probably per se
unconstitutional. 51 The possibility of a censorship board banning or
deleting parts of a film because disorder or riot might be caused
is not clear. It appears reasonable that the court would apply
46 "[T]he broad justiciable issue is therefore present as to whether the ambit
of constitutional protection includes complete and absolute freedom to
exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture. It is that
question alone which we decide .... Petitioner's narrow attack upon the
ordinance does not require that any consideration be given to the validity
of the standards set out therein. They are not challenged and are not
before us." 365 U.S. 43, 46 (1961).
47 See note 22 supra.
48 Even though the court may find the censorship board's standard in viola-
tion of those areas protected within the First Amendment, the court
seemingly prefers to apply the Procedural Due Process test first. There
is authority for this approach: "2. The Court will not 'anticipate a ques-
tion of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it'[or] '... . unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.. ..'
"3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied . . .'
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-7 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
As to the Roth test and obscenity in general, see the companion com-
ment preceeding.
49 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
50 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
51 State v. Smith, 48 Ohio Op. 310, 108 N.E.2d 582 (1952).
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the same tests in motion pictures as it does in other fields of expres-
sion. Ever since Terminiello v. Chicago, 2 the "clear and present
danger" test appears to be of little value.53 Therefore, it seems
reasonable that the court would scrutinize the standards applied by
the various censorship boards for censoring motion pictures in the
same manner the court scrutinizes laws in other fields which limit
freedom of expression.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the holding in the second Times case is narrow in
respect only to the right to view and not necessarily to the right to
censor pictures, the court cannot limit its decision solely to obscene
films. It necessarily follows that if the censor has the right to view,
he must view everything in order to ascertain if the picture is ob-
scene. If any film can be censored, then he may see all films. 54
While the time it takes to view motion pictures is reasonably
short, if the same system of prior inspection were to be applied to
52 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
53 In a recent New York case, Rockwell v. Morris, 29 Law Week 2385 (N.Y.
Sup Ct. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1961), a "self-styled" American Nazi applied
for a permit from the commissioner of parks in order to speak, and was
not given alternative suitable location and date as required by the city
ordinance. The New York court held such conduct by the commissioner
violated the New York Constitution, and stated: "There is no power in
government under our Constitution to exercise prior restraint of the
expression of views, unless it is demonstrable on a record that such
expression will immediately and irreparably create injury to the public
weal. . . . Only if [speaker] speaks criminally (or, perhaps, if it is es-
tablished on a proper record, in that very rare case, that he will speak
criminally, not because he once did, but that he will this time, and
irreparable harm will ensue) can his right to speak be cut off." Id. at 2386.
Times Film Corporation is now appealing a Virginia case which up-
held the censor's refusal to grant a necessary permit on the grounds
that the movie in question might cause "disorder." New York Times,
Feb. 26, 1961, p. 54, col. 1.
54 It is interesting to compare the requirement of "probable cause" which
must, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
be satisfied before an arrest or search can be made with the court's de-
cision in the instant case, which in effect sanctions the seizure of the
film with no showing of probable cause. The argument, for example,
made in the instant case, that a seizure without probable cause should be
sustained because in many cases a search is necessary to uncover any
evidence of crime, when advanced in the search and seizure area, has
generally been rejected. See State v. Buxton, 238 Ind. 93, 148 N.E.2d
547 (1958).
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other media, then the time element might become repressive. But
even disregarding the time element, the exhibitor now and the
author possibly, in the future, is at the mercy of a zealous censor
who wishes to "protect" society from "harmful" ideas. Under such
a system, delays could be costly to the industry while appeals are
taken through the courts.55
Under censorship, in cases where relief against prior restraint
is not constitutionally protected, the exhibitor is deprived of a jury
trial which is available under criminal statutes.56 Under the crim-
inal procedure, the defendant has the presumption of innocence,
trial of the issues involved, a determination of the facts, and other
Procedural Due Process safeguards. The benefit of censorship laws
to society is doubtful, 7 and the harm to a free society is obvious.58
G. Bradford Cook, '62
55 "Vindication by the courts of The Miracle was not had until five years
after the Chicago censor refused to license it." Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 73 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
56Many states have statutes making the exhibition of obscene, immoral,
indecent, or impure motion pictures a criminal act. ILL. REV. STAT.
c. 38 § 470 (1959); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 1141(1) (1955); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-193 (1953); OHIO REV. CODE § 2605.40 (1955); VT. REV.
STAT. § 8492 (1947); WIS. STAT. § 351.38(3) (1953).
57 See KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY & THE LAW 267 to 280 (1959).
58 See dissenting opinions in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S.
43, 50-84 (1961).
